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Abstract 
This article explores local trade union strategies in the context of MNC restructuring in 
French auto suppliers. From a theoretical standpoint, this study proposes a 
multidimensional analytic framework confronting three different, yet complementary, 
approaches: 1. the relative power of unions and how this power manifests itself in the social 
relations of actors; 2. the national institutions and opportunity structures that constrain actor 
choices; and 3. the contingencies relating to the structures of multinational firms and their 
production sites. From a methodological standpoint, we compare two different local cases 
(France-1, France-2) that have experienced restructuring threats from their parent MNCs. 
The core data of this research is based on semi-structured interviews (21) with elected 
union representatives from both sites, as well as expert witnesses at various levels within 
the sector. This article argues that unions’ strategies are best understood as a function of 
power resources and capabilities, social relationships at different levels, and types of MNC 
governance. In particular, this article argues that local trade unions should develop 
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“cognitive” power, a strategic capability, in order to impact decision-making in 
multinational corporations. 
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How do unions strategize about corporate restructuring? This article addresses this question 
by examining how local unions have responded to the restructuring threats of multinational 
corporations’ (MNCs) subsidiaries in France. In terms of theory, this study explores three 
core analytical approaches to how union strategies interact with corporate restructuring and 
similar phenomena. Informed by these three strands, this study examines whether union 
strategies are best understood through: 1. the relative power of unions and how this power 
manifests itself in the social relations of actors; 2. the national institutions and opportunity 
structures that constrain actor choices; and 3. the contingencies relating to the structures of 
multinational firms and their production sites. The study is based on two cases studies of 
local sites in France which have experienced corporate restructuring since the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008 and the ensuing automobile industry crisis of 2008-2010. These sites 
are situated in first tier automobile production chains set up for supplying German 
multinational firms. The case studies investigated in this study are informed by semi-
structured interviews (21) with elected union representatives from both sites, as well as 
expert witnesses at various levels within the sector.  
 
These case studies demonstrate that it is difficult to explain union strategies through a 
single factor. Using multidisciplinary explanations, this paper shows that strategies adopted 
are results of a conjunction of factors, thus interrogating common knowledge of the effect 
of the institutional context on local actors. In fact, the evidence presented in this paper 
suggests that it was the proactive strategies of those operating independently of local 
institutional contexts that proved most effective in countering restructuring threats and that 
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these strategies were strongly affected by social dynamics and power developed by the 
local unions.  
 
This paper makes this argument through five sections. It begins by introducing a multi-
disciplinary theoretical framework for understanding union strategies and corporate 
restructuring, then proceeds with an outline of its methodology, two in-depth case analyses, 
and then compares these two cases while discussing the scope of this research. Finally, this 
paper concludes with an analysis of the nature of union power and social relations in 
contexts of immense pressure. 
 
Union strategies and corporate restructuring: towards a 
multidimensional framework 
 
Core typologies of union strategies, in a context of corporate restructuring, have framed 
them through an “oppositional” and “cooperative” dichotomy. According to this 
dichotomy, local unions facing plant closure threats and related forms of workplace change 
may pursue one of two choices. Local unions may either oppose management plans to enact 
change, or cooperate with company managers in hopes of influencing the restructuring 
process. In a study on corporate restructuring in the steel industry, Frost (2001) exposed the 
analytical limitations of this typology. She argued that this typology fails to capture the 
range of complexities inherent in union responses to workplace change, and importantly, 
these strategies reflect the relative strengths of union capabilities. Other authors have 
proposed their own respective frameworks to surpass the limitations of this dichotomy 
(Lévesque et Murray, 2005; Bacon et Blyton, 2004; Meardi et al., 2009). Briefly put, these 
authors have identified four types of union strategy: 1. Exclusion: the union is excluded 
from the process and cannot influence management’s efforts to enact restructuring; 2. 
Unilateral opposition: the union directly opposes restructuring without influencing 
company managers; 3. Structured cooperation: the union involves itself in the restructuring 
process and cooperates with company managers; 4. Proactive opposition: without 
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completely rejecting corporate objectives, the union strives to propose alternative solutions 
to restructuring through the mobilization of internal and external resources. 
 
How do we explain the varieties of union positions? One approach postulates that union 
strategies can be explained through an analysis of actor dynamics, paying particular 
attention to the development of power resources and actor capabilities. It argues that actor 
embeddedness in social relations at the local level influences strategies. Lévesque and 
Murray (2002, 2010, 2011) have demonstrated that the most proactive local unions were 
those that acquired power resources at the local, national and international levels. As it 
happens, dynamics relating to internal solidarity, external solidarity, and strategic capacities 
can explain the varieties of posturing by unions, and in effect, their capacities for 
innovation and union renewal. This power emanates from either economic advantage 
(structural power) or the development of power resources and organizational capacities 
(associational power) (Wright, 2000). In a similar vein, Pulignano and Stewart (2012) have 
highlighted that the most accomplished unions are those with well-developed external 
resources, particularly in the form of horizontal (across establishments) or vertical (with 
national or international union federations) alliances. Union positioning is also a reflection 
of strategic investments across numerous levels, union renewal, and through the 
strengthening of power resources through the “manipulation” of multiple levels of action 
and transnational union campaigns (Munck, 2008; Hennebert, 2009; McCalum, 2013). 
 
Local embeddedness, meaning social relations throughout the production process, is also an 
important factor of analysis (Rainnie et al., 2007). Union-management relations and the 
dynamics of social dialogue influence how unions formulate strategies vis-à-vis corporate 
restructuring (Lévesque, 2003; Pulignano et Stewart, 2012). In addition to local 
embeddedness, political relations manifested at the regional level provide unions with key 
resources for influencing workplace change. Moreau (2008) suggests that the how unions 
relate to local political and economic institutions plays an important role in shaping 
restructuring. Thus, the concepts of actor dynamics, power, and embeddedness are critical 
for understanding why different unions pursue divergent strategies. 
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A second approach argues that institutional contexts and opportunity structures influence 
the type of strategies available to union actors in contexts of corporate restructuring. 
Accordingly, the business system and its influence on firm strategies is accountable for the 
differences across regimes and the relations between actors (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Different political regimes offer different opportunities for actors in industrial relations, as 
jurisdictions’ historical roots in protest politics and ingrained methods of conflict resolution 
influence actor responses to workplace issues (Tilly and Tarrow, 2006; Godard, 2009). In 
particular, the legal framework shapes how our understanding vis-à-vis plant closures and 
influences the processes of enacting corporate restructuring (Coutu and Bourgault, 2015). 
We can thereby suppose that institutional traditions, as well as public policies addressing 
issues pertaining to employment, have strongly influenced union responses to firm strategy 
(Pulignano et Dekocker, 2015). In the French context, social costs of a plant closing 
influence actor relations as economic layoffs of 10 or more workers implies the creation of 
a social plan (“Plan de sauvegarde de l’emploi”), generally of high cost for the employer. 
The rights of works councils (information/consultation/economic expertise) and European 
legislation (relating to the European Works Council, EWC) offer considerable resources to 
employee representatives. Furthermore, majority union/unions can exert a right to oppose 
(“droit d’opposition”) to agreements signed at the local level. The political regime thereby 
structures the institutional resources available to union actors in the context of plant 
closures.  
 
A third approach postulates that the contingencies relating to the structures of multinational 
firms explains differences in union strategy (Meardi et al., 2009 ; Rutherford et Holmes, 
2008). In fact, the resources at a multinational firm’s disposal aid this actor in countering 
the influence of labor laws, unions, and political actors in the production network 
(Rutherford and Holmes, 2012). Meardi et al. (2009) have demonstrated that the type of 
integration and degree of site autonomy affects union strategies (both vertically and 
horizontally). The financial well-being of a multinational firm and a production site also 
bears an influence on the available repertoires of union action, as it is positively related 
with the presence of proactive union strategies (Pulignano et Stewart, 2012). The type of 
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corporate governance and capital possessed by a multinational firm, which are no small part 
related to its status as a publicly held corporation, a privately held company, or largely 
owned by private equity firms, has an impact on employee participation (Lippert et al., 
2014; Appelbaum and Batt, 2014). In sum, beyond the attributes and resources relating to 
actors or institutional regimes, the structure of multinational firms also bears considerable 
influence over union strategies.   
 
This study attempts to balance the influence of the factors presented by these different 
theoretical approaches (see table 1), factors that are in many respects complementary. 
 
Table 1. Analytical framework of this research project 
Approach Theoretical Proposition 
Actor Dynamics 
- Power resources and strategic 
capabilities 
- Social and political embeddedness 
The power resources developed by unions 
and the type of social relations maintained 
by this actor (social dialogue, political 
alliances) shape union strategies 
Institutional opportunity structures The institutional regime and legal 
framework relating to corporate 
restructuring shape union strategies 
Contingencies 
- Type of site integration 
- Financial well-being of site 
- Type of capital 
The contingencies relating to the structure 
of multinational firms and production sites 
shape union strategies 
 
Research Methodology 
 
This research is centered on two local cases which have experienced restructuring threats 
following the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the auto industry crisis of 2008-2010. These 
two cases were situated in France. While many characteristics relating to production on 
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both sites are different, these two sites bear many similarities. Both sites are situated on the 
same level within the value chain (two first tier original equipment manufacturers), are 
owned by large multinational firms of German origin, and both have faced restructuring 
threats at the same moment (from 2009 to 2011). This case selection took into account the 
theoretical relevance and practical interest of these French cases. The selection criteria were 
applied through a preliminary collection of data from union representatives. This was 
carried out in a hierarchical fashion. This initial exposure to the field enabled the research 
methodology, including the case selection, to be informed by industry practitioners. This 
strategy also facilitated an in-depth framing of the context surrounding these cases.  
 
This study is based on qualitative research data acquired from three sources. First, this 
study is based on semi-structured interviews administered with twenty-one union 
representatives and expert witnesses in the sector from 2012 to 2014. The majority of these 
interviews were carried out with elected unionists from the two cases, and on two 
occasions. In addition to these interviews, this study examined secondary data sources 
(corporate records, union archival documents, and press articles). Finally, statistical data 
from different databases was collective and analyzed to understand the evolution of the 
automobile sector in France, before and after the financial crisis of 2007-2008, and before 
and after the auto industry crisis of 2008-2010.   
 
The case of France-1 is part of a German multinational. This MNC is active in the 
automobile equipment sector, as well as other industrial sectors. Its corporate governance is 
particular as the firm’s private capital structure with a stable ownership. The factory 
produces Diesel pumps to be inserted into motors produced by various European 
automobile manufacturers. It is vertically integrated within the division, and its pumps are 
regularly expedited to factories that specialize in fuel injection systems. The union 
membership rate of this site is considered high compared to the French standard (with 
approximately one hundred members). Approximately 600 employees worked on this site 
in 2009. The majority union is the CFDT who won 54% of the voting at the last work 
council elections and has a majority of the seats in representative institutions of the plant, 
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including the general secretary position of the work council. The CGT is the second union 
with 28% of the voting. The CGC (managerial staff union) has almost the rest of the voting. 
Historically, the CFDT and CGC have worked closely while the CGT, in a minority 
position, has played the role of opposition at the site level. Finally, the plant is directly 
represented at European Work Council as the general secretary of the work council has a 
seat at this level. 
 
The case of France-2 is also owned by a multinational firm of German origin. However, 
this multinational corporation is listed on the stock market. It currently produces 
automobile electronics and its research and development activities take place on site. 
Hundreds of engineers develop products which are produced on this site for the 
multinational firm. Thus, it is horizontally integrated, in that the development, production, 
and sale of its products are carried out within a single site. It bears considerable autonomy 
in its activities supplying and partnering with various European manufacturers. France-2 
has experienced considerable growth since 1990. 2600 employees were working on this site 
as of 2009. Union membership on this site is relatively weak, as only approximately 100 
employees are unionized. The CFDT and the CGT, at the last work council elections, won 
60% of the voting and posses the majority of the representation seats (4 each out of 10) on 
the work council, while the CGC won almost 30% of the voting. The general secretary of 
the work council comes from the CFDT. Two other unions (FO, CFTC) won the rest of the 
voting, but failed to have any representatives. FO, CFTC and CGC have historically been 
closed to the managers and tended to sign agreements quickly while not interrogating the 
managers’ arguments. At the other end of the spectrum, the CFDT and the CGT, while 
having some minor divergences, worked closely and have adopted a “common front” 
strategy in face of the managers. Finally, the plant is directly represented at the European 
Work Council as the general secretary has a seat at this level. 
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Analyzing the Two Cases: France-1 and France-2 
 
France-1: A successful case for industrial restructuring 
 
Before the closing threat of 2009, the case of France-1 was a precarious one. The number of 
workers on this site diminished since the 1990s, and in 2004, the first attempt to close the 
plant was initiated by the multinational firm. The Diesel pump produced within the site was 
on its last lifeline and few alternatives presented themselves to the company. The MNC 
proposed to grant the site a new pump in exchange for some concessions. These 
concessions relate to the debate over a policy mandating the 35 hour work week (Loi 
d’orientation et d’incitation relative à la réduction du temps de travail), France’s first 
experience with this policy since it was put in effect. Finally, the new product was granted 
to France-1 in exchange for an approximately 12% reduction in labor costs. These 
concessions were thus mostly oriented at extending the working hours of the employees on 
a weekly basis by giving up “RTT days” (Réduction du temps de travail, Working Time 
Reduction) that were included in the French legislation. A massive majority of the 
workforce (98%) supported these concessions.  
 
This solution did not guarantee a long-term future for the factory. In 2009, traditional forms 
of pump production became outdated as new European norms for auto parts were put in 
force. Despite repeated warnings from the union about the future of the product, the 
multinational corporation and its division introduced a strategic realignment due to 
overcapacity and cost rationales. This was evident by one account from a local trade 
unionist who contextualized the situation:  
 
Basically, despite the current path for this pump, the unions still 
questioned the necessity of new products for this site. Mail was therefore 
sent to Germany, meetings with management took place in Germany, 
meetings with the leadership and with management of the company took 
place in France. In saying it, it becomes urgent. What do you bring us as 
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new products? What quickly tipped us off was that we learned that a new 
generation of pumps was coming, which were to replace the pumps that 
we were fabricating, and these new pumps would have no connection to 
our site.  
 
In December 2009, a letter was sent to the employees announcing the factory would be 
closing within two years. While union representatives expected such an outcome, the 
secretary of the Works Council, an experienced unionist, decided not to give up and to 
actively search for new mandates for the site. Furthermore, this site’s union representatives 
swiftly activated their external networks. They made contact with union representatives at 
various levels, both nationally (in their own federation) and internationally (via the 
European Works Council). The first act carried out by the local union, after initial contact 
with representatives at other levels, was particularly fascinating. The union with majority 
presence in the firm organized a bike rally from their factory to the company headquarters 
in Germany. The objective of this initiative was to send a warning to company executives 
through the mobilization of their German counterparts towards the goal of saving this 
factory. This rally culminated with a multi-site protest in Germany. On account of this 
context, the German managers agreed to meet with French union representatives to discuss 
alternatives.  
 
This meeting proved successful. Taken aback by the willpower of the union representatives 
for obtaining a new direction for their factory, the company management agreed to set up a 
re-industrialization committee with broad and flexible powers. However, while the plant 
was scheduled to close within two years, the committee had a fairly long period to explore 
alternative solutions. It is noteworthy that this innovation is not common in France, since it 
took form outside of the purview of the company works council. This is an innovative 
framework in which the company's stakeholders can freely discuss research on new 
products. 
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The commission was put in place and the union representatives called on economic experts 
to collect and analyze significant amounts of information. They used many levers, 
including meetings with management at the national level or within the European Works 
Council to gain access to information on company strategies. In parallel with the activation 
of external resources, the trade unionists, with help from experts, constructed a “resumé” of 
the site. This resumé attempted to demonstrate the site’s competencies and capacity for 
accommodating new products. This site resumé provided company managers with a strong 
argument that France-1 was willing and able to remain in operation. A local actor described 
the strategy in the following manner:  
 
At the same time, we prepared a resumé of the site. On the site, beyond the 
machines and individual skills, there is a collective of workers that possess 
collective skills. We used them in the group. There are some people who 
exhibited the best performance within the group, etc. This is what people 
don’t necessarily understand! Managers do not know the details of their 
site. When we tell them that site is the benchmark within the Diesel 
enterprise, the managers say “this is interesting, it is them who have done 
the best work”. We circulated bottom up information, and we have carried 
out some studies to provide insights on the paths going forward. 
 
In the context of the commission, unionists and managers have created a favorable context 
for discussion. This dialogue is open, constructive, positive, and structured towards seeking 
out alternative solutions. This social dialogue enables unionist to play a role on numerous 
fronts. In addition to promoting local contexts with the help of factory managers, these 
unionists can collect economic information from different levels that are reported to the 
commission. While plan closure threats weigh heavy on the factory, its union 
representatives are well placed to foster employee solidarity on the site. Numerous 
assemblies have been organized with site employees who are regularly informed on the 
progress of the union’s work. As an economic expert explained, this “back and forth 
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process” gives workers confidence in the union’s approach while maintaining a steady 
work pace despite workplace tensions. Of this, this expert said the following:  
 
When the guys are in a factory for 9 months not knowing if they will have 
a job, they are generally unmotivated. They then continued to work as if 
nothing happened. That was well played. If they continued to work, it’s 
because they had confidence in the approach of their union representatives, 
the representatives that gave them information relentlessly to tell them the 
progress they made.  
 
Over of the course of several work months, unionists and expert economists argued that an 
area of growth exists within the multinational firm. Given that the French Rhône-Alpes 
region is poised for the development of green energy, the MNC expressed interest in 
growing its solar panels division. The competencies associated with this site were 
presented to the German management, who were about to give the mandate for production 
to a site in the Czech Republic. The re-industrialization commission succeeded in 
convincing company managers that production ought to be shifted towards France-1 for its 
capacity at adapting to different contexts, even if it resides within a totally different 
production segment within the firm. In 2010, it was announced that industrial restructuring 
will be carried out and that the site will change from Diesel production to manufacturing 
solar panels. The damage, in terms of employment, was minimal. 70 jobs were lost, the 
majority of which were eliminated through early retirements. 
 
France-2: opposition and conflict concerning “blackmail for employment” 
 
Since the 1980s, the site was owned by a German multinational company and was 
dedicated to research, develop, and produce electronic parts. The site grew immensely in 
the 1990s, after which more than 2,000 workers were distributed across three plants. The 
MNC, in 2007, decided to sell its automobile division. The principal shareholders, the 
banks, and the government required that a repurchase be made by an enterprise of German 
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origin. This repurchase was finally authorized, at a high price, at the beginning of the 
automobile crisis. The new owner, whose financial well-being was very strong prior to the 
takeover, experienced a drastic debt increase when the European car market collapsed. The 
global managers were replaced, under the pressure of new shareholders, and the managers 
decided to remedy the financial situation by enacting a coercive strategy towards its sites. 
In the case of France-2, local managers required that layoffs be carried out through early 
retirements. These managers promised union managers that these will be the only 
concessions, and that the situation will only improve over time.  
 
A few months later, in 2010, management reversed its decision and required further 
concessions. These concessions were demanded by the headquarters, who asked local sites 
to reduce their labor costs by 8%. It should be noted that while these demands were 
initiated by the German headquarters, the sites had the flexibility to structure their plans to 
meet the needs of local contexts. As one local trade unionist recounted:  
 
There are also, in groups like ours, conformity across numerous factors. 
There is debt, but also the expressed desire of employers for cutting the 
costs of labor. Not that we were a laboratory, but when we viewed the 
plan, we saw that they strove to give us the impression that it was based on 
studies from MEDEF, the French national employers’ organization: “what 
would be good, for cutting costs, is to do it in such a way that you cut the 
costs of labor”.  Preparing flexibility, preparing an attack on the 35 hour 
work week. The group had a strong strategy, but its articulation and how it 
would go locally, the influence of the strategies of French locals, shaped 
how French managers behaved.  
 
These concessions required that a plan be signed and impacted the reduction of leave 
provided for under the law on the 35 hour workweek. Company management announced 
that if the plan was not signed, one of the three factories would be closed. The relationship 
between company management and union representatives rapidly deteriorated, considering 
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that the relationship had been amicable until then. This plan created some confusion 
amongst elected representatives, as the site’s performance was more than acceptable, and 
the orders were well filled. Given this economically favorable situation, the majority 
unions cooperated and decided to oppose management intentions through all of the 
mediums possible.  
 
This strategy was essentially one of research and data collection. The majority unions 
called in an economist to collect and analyze the data that was available under the 
information and consultation rights of the works council. In addition to this local 
negotiation, company managers tried to influence the unions by comparing the site with 
similar locations in Germany. These German sites were experiencing some difficulties and 
were expected to sign similar agreements to that proposed in France. In addition, the fact 
that the Germans were purportedly signing brought legitimacy to the logic that a similar 
agreement could save the location. The majority unions reacted through the European 
Works Council by coming into contact with German unionists in order to exchange 
information and to oppose the agreements. When interacting with these German unions, 
the French unions learned of a different picture than the one painted by the company 
managers. Essentially, IG Metall was preparing to reject the concessions sought by the 
company. As a local trade unionist explained, some sites did sign concessions, but these 
sites were experiencing real difficulties: “There were some sites that were really 
threatened; these sites had to sign such agreements. After some discussion, this was 
something that they were trying to get out of. Around 5 or 6 bargaining units had signed 
small agreements. IG Metall had now decided to reject all of these agreements”.  
 
The employer’s argument evolved in conjunction with the information collected by the 
site’s unions. Since negotiations on the plan were stalled, management requested that this 
heated issue be subjected to mediation. This mediation failed largely because the unions 
left the process and were mainly convinced that the managers were using “employment 
blackmail" to get concessions. These concessions were the result of momentary debts, and 
were not rooted in any sort of effective situation relating to the site’s operations. On 
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account of this failure, company managers decided to organize a referendum, with the help 
of the minority unions, on the restructuring plan in hopes of convincing a maximum 
number of employees that the agreements were essential to the plant’s survival. The 
majority unions called for a boycott when it appeared that many of their workers were 
resolute to vote yes. The referendum won 57% in favor of management, a win that came at 
a negative cost for the relationship between the union representatives and many employees. 
Several local trade unionists described the situation as follows: 
 
They used management intermediaries to relay messages, to persuade 
people into believing false information. What was false, finally, were the 
budget figures that were deliberately not updated for over a year. This 
was mass manipulation.  
 
It was downright tampered with. In parallel with this manipulation was 
another strategy that was more effective. Our CEO organized lunches 
with executives and had managed to arrange this for 8 to 12 people in the 
morning in order to convince them of the strategy. He explained the 
blackboard. There was always someone who posed the question: but 
what can we do? They created a group with a real dynamic to oppose us. 
They even made a demonstration against us! 
 
Right there, on the banners: “CFDT+CGT=unemployment. They will 
sacrifice you for political ideas.” They even called for the resignation of 
the work council. 
 
With an elevated level of violence. I tried to talk to them, but it was 
impossible.  
 
Following the referendum, the management seemed to have significant liberty in 
implementing the cost reduction plan. The plan was signed by the minority unions whom 
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were deemed as having a close relationship with the management. A final attempt to 
mediate was made, however this attempt failed as its predecessors. Union representatives 
then decided to use their right to objection under French law. This right, a prerogative of 
majority unions’ representatives, enables them to oppose the agreements signed within a 
facility. As the secretary of the works-council illustrated, the “droit d’opposition” was part 
of their strategy: “despite everything, we acted responsibly and opposed the plan. French 
law gives us the right to say: yes, the agreement was signed, but we are the majority. We 
then dropped the agreement”.  
 
Following this opposition, we ended up in a round of negotiations based on worker salaries. 
The company managers again tried to pass the plan, a move which provoked discontent 
amongst the unions and their sympathizers. A strike was then initiated, in response to 
company directives. In effect, new economic information was made available to employee 
representatives portraying a climate quite unlike that described by the company’s 
management. The danger of a drastic drop in production seemed in fact unlikely, at least for 
the next few years. Company managers finally decided to drop the plan and no plant closure 
was announced since this decision. The three factories produced at an elevated level using 
the same number of employees, thereby demonstrating impressive efficiency gains.  
 
Case study comparisons and discussion 
 
The cases of France-1 and France-2 were in many respects different. Therefore, it should be 
emphasized that two divergent union strategies were observed, one of proactive opposition 
(France-1) and one of unilateral opposition (France-2).	In the first case, the strategy is the 
result of initial involvement by the majority union in the firm. Taking into account that the 
situation was precarious and that the closure of the factory producing Diesel pumps 
appeared imminent, union representatives attempted to preserve the site by surpassing the 
limitations of their local contexts and in looking for alternative mandates within the 
German multinational firm. Through the mobilization of internal and external networks, 
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these representatives were well positioned to put in place a commission on re-
industrialization. The committee, led through a positive form of social dialogue, possibly 
leading to an industrial conversion of the site, had the potential to preserve hundreds of jobs 
in the France-1 case.  
 
On the contrary, the second case demonstrates a different form of strategy. France-2, whose 
shareholders changed in 2007, manufactured advanced products and was in a strong 
financial position. In a context of eroding union-management relations, the managerial side 
had attempted to impose a cost reduction plan for employees, bearing the burden that one of 
three production areas in France-2 will close. The majority union, convinced that 
management’s position on employment was a bluff, blocked management efforts through 
the institutions that were available to its works councils and union representatives. Not 
without a hitch, this blockage resulted in maintaining the status quo, as no factory closure 
took place, alongside with management’s abandonment of this initiative.  
 
What explains the differences between these types of strategies? Three factors appear 
fundamental for understanding union strategies towards restructuring in France. The first is 
the difference in power resources and capabilities mobilized between the two cases. The 
case of France-1 was one in which the unions mobilized sophisticated power resources 
oriented towards researching alternative solutions. The internal solidarity in this case was 
strong, as the workers believed in the path pursued by their representatives. This was 
assured through regular contact between these workers and their representatives. The union 
holding majority status mobilized external networks, not only to access information, but to 
influence the restructuring process and managers across multiple strategic levels within the 
multinational firm. The links between the national federation and the EWC enabled the 
union to act proactively. It made use of institutional resources as often as alternative levers 
of power through strategic investments. Its strategic capacity was considerably strong, in 
that the union successfully constructed a site “resumé” while leading an influential 
commission, both of which are particularly exceptional considering the French context. The 
case of France-2 differed in this respect. In addition to not possessing any power, the 
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majority unions in this case relied on the structural economic position of this site for 
harnessing any form of advantage through the negotiations. The internal solidarity was in 
many respects feeble, in that few employees on this site were union members (even when 
compared to unions nationally in France) and there were many conflicts which were created 
internally to the organization.  
 
Even though if a lot of power in the French case comes from law and regulations, our study 
shows that internal and solidarity as well as strategic capabilities are crucial to understand 
the proactivity of a local union. As Dufour and Hege (2010) have argued, European unions 
– and especially French unions – can count on strong external legitimacy that derives from 
institutions and institutionalization at the political and at the firm levels. However, these 
positions are not sufficient to ensure internal legitimacy and proactivity at the local level. 
As the differences between the two cases have shown, power resources must be developed 
at the local level. France-1 could count on a strong implantation and legitimacy at the local 
level, while the France-2 case ended with conflicts with other unions and workers. Taking 
simplistically, the density of union members at the local level is not crucial since all 
workers, in the French context, can participate at the work council elections without being 
actual union members. However, in precarious context like restructuring, mobilization of 
workers behind local union strategies remains critical and, as the France-1 case has shown, 
the legitimacy of the union project can be reinforced by a strong implantation at the site 
level. As Murray et al. (2010) argued, while not affecting the relationship with managers 
and their overall legitimacy, a decrease in union membership can although hampered the 
representative capacity of local unions in France in the long run. 
 
Furthermore in the France-2 case, the union’s external networks were rarely mobilized, and 
the majority unions had a very weak relationship with their federations and confederations. 
If these representatives used the EWC, they would limit themselves to establishing contact 
with their German colleagues to oppose the employers' discourse, an effort that includes 
information sharing. Being convinced that the reasons for the restructuring were a fait 
accompli, they did not offer alternative solutions. In their view, initiative on the part of 
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local and global managers was based on wrong information and in order to manipulate the 
workers. It appears that strategic capabilities, as Lévesque and Murray (2010) argue, are 
crucial to understanding trade union power and strategies. Thus, what allows local trade 
unions to concretize resources and power lay in the capabilities. In particular, these are the 
capabilities of framing, learning, and articulation. France-1 has shown that through the 
development of complex capabilities, local union strategies can have a concrete impact on 
the restructuring process and to opening opportunities for alternative schemes to the plant 
closing.  
 
A second factor, affecting both actor strategy and power resources, is the quality of social 
dialogue and labor-management relations. This factor brings to light a contrast in both cases 
and has influenced the progress of strategies pursued during the restructurings. In the case 
of France-1, the interview respondents confirmed that the quality of social dialogue and its 
effect on the union’s position were particularly important. The multinational firm’s 
management team, who shared a positive history with social dialogue institutions, played 
an important role on the re-industrialization committee. This committee opened up the 
potential for a real synergy between the local actors in an attempt to find alternative 
solutions. This union-firm dynamic explained, at least partly, why an alternative framework 
was developed by the majority union and through the deployment of its proactive 
strategies. It should also be noted that these dynamics were not the result of particular traits 
inherent in French institutions, but was rather due to a set of contextual conditions created 
by actors at the firm level. These differences, manifested in the case of France-2, are 
particularly salient. Following the site’s takeover by a new multinational firm, the majority 
union distanced itself from company management, the latter adopting a more aggressive 
tone towards labor relations within the firm. Relations between these actors deteriorated 
rapidly thereafter, as initial confidence levels did not last and the two parties were at 
loggerheads over the restructuring project. This dynamics of social dialogue, or rather the 
notable absence of such dialogue, forced the majority unions to adopt an intransigent 
attitude and to block employer initiatives, particularly through the right of objection 
provided under French legislation.  
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These differences in the social dialogue elements relate to a third factor: the influence of 
contingencies. The structure of capital, which was different between the cases, provided 
one more way for understanding actors’ strategic positioning. The multinational that 
possesses France-1 is less dependent on financial markets, given its reliance on private 
capital provided by a family foundation, and has historically made long-term commitments 
to its employees and towards the development of its sites. France-2 is a listed company, and 
is dependent on financial markets and is under debt pressures precipitated from the collapse 
of financial markets. While this does not fully explain the union’s positions, it is an 
important factor, and has been confirmed by the interviewees who discussed social 
dialogue dynamics. In fact, our results are consistent with the findings of Lippert et al. 
(2014) that have shown that public companies offer less space for employee voice thus 
being an obstacle to implement ‘high-road’ system of labor relations and work 
organization. Embedded in financialization dynamics those are short-term by nature, 
employers “can’t keep their side of the bargain”, as Paul Thompson (2003) has rightly 
pointed out.  
 
In addition to the structure of capital, the type of integration and segmentation within a site 
should be emphasized. France-2 is horizontally integrated and has accrued autonomy which 
permits it to sell products to numerous clients. In addition, the site’s financial well-being, in 
the eyes of unionists, is not well-served by imposing concessions and through closing one 
of its locations. These contingency factors have influenced decision-making pertaining to 
union strategy and have convinced elected representatives to opt for a ferocious 
oppositional strategy. In terms of contract, France-1 was vertically integrated and 
dependent on a single product. The financial well-being of a site, and that chain in 
particularly, was poor. The possibility of a plant closing was more tangible for that reason. 
These factors influenced the union strategies in the sense that two options presented 
themselves to these unions: let the site close and collect compensation under French law, or 
on the contrary, try to find alternative mandates for the site. The second option was 
preferred, but not without difficulty or sustained investment from elected representatives. 
Furthermore, it appears that economic contingencies in the France-2 case could have played 
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a crucial role as the horizontal position and the financial well-being of the plant enabled the 
majority unions to block the managerial plans. However, the fact that the majority unions 
did not had any spaces to negotiate with the managers, that the minority unions positioned 
themselves against them, that legitimacy was precarious in relations to the workers, and 
thus that the power and capacities, outside traditional institutional leverages, were low, 
contributed to the forging of a more simplistic and traditional strategy. This strategy, also, 
cannot be taking for granted since a rapid change in the context of the site or the 
multinational and as the auto companies have develop complex form of “whipsawing” 
between different locations (Greer and Hauptmeier, 2016).   
 
Finally, these two cases demonstrated that union strategies, in the context of restructuring, 
cannot be explained through a single factor, but rather through an ensemble of factors. 
These are both structural (contingent factors), related to the properties of local unions 
(development of power resources) or relational/dialectical (dynamics of social dialogue) 
factors. It should be emphasized that these factors are mutually strengthen each other: 
power resources can be increased, at least in part, by the dynamics of social dialogue. These 
last factors relate to the type of capital, at least in the cases examined for this study. The 
influence of these factors is not mutually exclusive, and can in fact be complementary.  
 
In light of this analysis, it is possible to assert that the institutional opportunity structures 
available to actors is important, but these do not explain the type of strategies used by these 
actors. The prerogatives of the works council (information/consultation, economic 
expertise), union rights, and the EWC are structural resources in both cases, yet fail to 
explain the differences in union strategy. As illustrated through this analysis, the resources 
deployed by the unions, embeddedness in social relations and contingencies best explain 
varieties in strategy. The French political regime, often presumed to be very interventionist, 
was not a factor in the cases examined in this study. The unionists who were interviewed 
confirmed that, despite initiatives to activate local political networks, these networks were 
not a factor affecting the formulation of their strategies, nor a resource that could be 
mobilized. At best, these politicians did not seem to understand the particular situation of 
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the multinational firms and thereby did not intervene directly. At worst, they showed 
indifference by relating these conflicts to "private relationships." 
 
Table 2 presents the highlights of our analysis. 
 
Table 2. Comparing France and France-2 
 
Analytical Factors France-1 France-2 
Strategies Proactive Opposition Unilateral Opposition 
Power resources and 
strategic capabilities 
- Internal solidarity 
- External solidarity 
- Strategic capabilities 
 
 
Strong 
Strong 
Strong 
 
 
Weak 
Medium 
Medium 
Embeddedness 
- Social dialogue 
- Regional institutional 
linkages, political 
alliances 
 
Positive 
 
Weak 
 
Negative 
 
Weak 
Contingency factors 
- Segmentation and 
integration 
- Financial well-being 
and site performance 
- Type of capital 
 
Vertical, little autonomy 
 
Poor 
 
Private 
 
Horizontal, high 
autonomy 
Strong 
 
Public 
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Conclusion 
 
This study aimed to provide insights concerning the use of local union strategies towards 
corporate restructuring following the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the ensuing auto 
industry crisis of 2008-2010. Drawing from three important theoretical strands of research 
on actor strategies, this study tested three explanations of union strategy in the context of 
union strategy with roots in: 1. The relative power of unions and how this power manifests 
itself in the social relations of actors; 2. the national institutions and opportunity structures 
that constrain actor choices; and 3. The contingencies relating to the structures of 
multinational firms and their production sites. In terms of research methodology, this 
qualitative study was based on two cases in France that permit an analysis of strategies 
taking into account the relevance of local contexts (France-1, France-2). The findings of 
this study illustrate a contrast across these two cases, in terms of the type of strategies 
mobilized and on the characteristics of these cases (contingencies and social dialogue 
dynamics).  
 
Although this research contains some methodological limitations, notably due to the small 
number of cases and the focus on the French context, there are some clear contributions 
from this study. Institutional frameworks relating to corporate restructuring are important, 
however, institutions alone do not explain how actors manage change in the workplace. 
This structural factor shapes the foundation, and even the boundaries, which influence how 
actors respond to specific contexts such as site closures. However, can these boundaries 
rooted in social and historical traditions be broken? This study demonstrates that, under 
certain conditions, unions have the capacity to surpass institutional constraints through 
innovation. Despite the persistence of “path dependency”, institutional constraints are 
surmountable, and institutions are simply one means at the disposal of worker 
representatives, not the only means. Surpassing these constraints must be understood as an 
interaction of different dimensions that this study has highlighted. It is both created by 
certain contextual factors and contingencies, opportunities that are specific to institutions 
that requires investment by union representatives, but these contingencies and institutional 
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tools must be understand and analyze in conjunction with the power levels and the 
alternatives that local trade unions can create. In that sense, France-1 is representative of 
this interaction, since specific contingencies (type of capital), social dialogue dynamics, 
certain institutions (the EWC, the economic experts) reinforced power resources and 
capabilities to thus create an original proactive strategy. 
 
These possibilities are predicated on the inclinations of union actors, who can innovate if 
they augment investments in non-traditional forms of action. While the “structural” versus 
“associational” power dichotomy may appear pertinent, this study highlights how power 
relates to learning, information, and their mobilization in specific contexts. “Cognitive” 
power can be proven useful to shaping restructuring processes, particularly through the 
identification of multiple points of local support (site characteristics, local economic 
information, relations with local managers), as well as those at the international level 
(union alliances, access to sources of decision-making). This type of union involvement is 
forged through the development of international resources (through solidarity and 
alternative framing) and through strategic investments at different levels. In particular, 
strategic capabilities associated to articulation, framing, and learning are crucial to 
understanding proactive union positions.  While international union action is not a solution, 
it can nonetheless provide union actors with repertoires of action, thereby enabling them to 
extricate themselves from local dependencies. As argued by McCallum (2013), 
international union action must be understood in conjunction with local battles, not in 
contradiction to them. 
 
Social dialogue and labor management relations are important dynamics emerging from 
this study. The MNC, despite trends towards streamlining, is an important field of 
contestation that is shaped by actor dynamics (Morgan et Kristensen, 2006; Kristensen et 
Zeitlin, 2005; Edwards and Bélanger, 2009). In this sense, this study demonstrates that a 
positive tradition of social dialogue can “open possibilities” for unions. Without falling into 
a naive understanding of management restructuring intentions, these relations can aid union 
representatives to devise alternative frameworks, through the collection of company 
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information and through the influence of decision-making. Again, adopting such strategies 
requires both sustained investment at different levels of action and must remain in the 
confidence of company stakeholders. This type of effort requires a paradigm shift away 
from traditional repertoires of action available to trade unions. 
 
Contingencies, without being over determinative, shape the strategies of local unions. The 
form of integration on a given site can provide a union with sources of structural power that 
is less accessible to others. This structural power derives from position in the production 
network, quality of production as well as financial results of a site as the France-2 case has 
shown.  The type of capital and corporate governance of firms, and to some extent the type 
of management follows, appear to be of some importance to understanding union-
management relations. In addition, this study confirms Lippert et al.’s (2004) argument 
concerning the impact of financial ownership on employee participation. Being less 
dependant on financial returns and short maturities, a private ownership structure can 
provide unions with a strategic advantage, insofar as such a union makes use of the 
participatory and open management process advocated by the MNC as a source of 
influence.         
 
In terms of union practices, this study demonstrates that despite precarious contexts, local 
unionists may be able to influence the restructuring efforts of multinational firms. These 
repertoires of action available to unions require integrating critical cost-cutting decisions 
with traditional union practices and making use of the important opportunity structures 
made available by the institutional regimes in which a firm is situated. They are the 
corollary of sustained investment in how the elected representatives perceive their role and 
can act strategically, both at local and other levels of action.  
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